

[After the fire of '23, Futon discovered some of his pre-Christian considerations of onto-epistemology. This document is one of several which were meant to form Futon's dissertation. Due to his abrupt conversion to Christianity, however, Futon decided that his former cogitations were "refusing to submit to the Lordship of Christ, as is evidenced in the manifest unconscious-conscious dialectic of latent animosity toward the Divine" (*Editorial 14, Parvum, Litterarum* 13.5 (1821): 3-17), and so he abandoned his project. His Christian work in the field of Onto-epistemology retains some of the emphases of his earlier atheistic writings, most especially of which is his subscription to certain fundamental Augustinian ontological and epistemological concepts.]

(Pages 1-3)

i.

The Subject of...What?

What does it mean to be a *subject*? We can proliferate endless theories, but should we wish to answer the question with any real objectivity, we need only look to the word *subject*. We are indeed subjects, but how are we to understand this designation? Are we subjects *to*, subjects *of*, or individual subjects? Furthermore, what are the consequences of being any of the aforementioned?

Let's begin with an example. Whenever I think about myself, I am not thinking about my self, but about how I think. I am not, quite literally, there where my thoughts are. It is in this sense that Descartes was entirely wrong, yet entirely right. Then where am I? I am implicated as being outside of the cognitive causal chain, in a sense, via my absence from cognition. The Cartesian cogito is my self, but an echoe of myself, that loses its original definitive characteristics during the transition from utterance to reverberation and conscious reflection. Now, this is interesting to note for one reason: I am *a* subject, but *a* subject *of* what? Of cognition? Yes, I am subject to the limitations cognition faces, but I am also subject to existential modifications as such. I am, but only under the constraints of, for example, linguistic *expression*. In a very different vein, however, I am *a* subject *to* my unconscious motivations and desires, *subjected* to the demands of desire amidst other subjects.

So, in a sense, the whole of our collective being is interdisciplinary*. And quite literally. The spatio-temporal constraints of *being-conscious* create subjectivity by limiting *unconsciousness*, if may neologize a little, to a secondary function of desiring without achieving, desiring without acting, and being without being subjected. *This is liberty in the truest sense. Being *behind* what is *enunciated*, as Lacan once stated (please note the correlation between the Lacanian notions of *and subjectivity and truth*), I am completely and truly free. The privileging of the "letter of the law" over the "spirit of the law" is powerfully reversed. However, I am still inclined to follow the law in order to effectively conserve and disseminate the desires of the unconscious, which are not in essence sexual, but intellectual. Contrary to Lacanianism and Freudianism, the unconscious and consciousness do not conflict with one another; the unconscious and consciousness are tied together by conscienceness.

Conscienceness guides the interactions between the unconscious and consciousness, creating the need for a distinction between those desires that are to be conserved and those that are to be routed through consciousness. Conscienceness is the fact that the unconscious *never* accidentally slips out, but makes a gradual appearance on its own, undefined, terms. I am not referring to a stringent a priori moral code that guides all the activities of subjective cognition. Not at all...

* Place at a later, denser portion of the text as the simplistic culmination of years of mental acrobatics and, thereby, establish its profundity.

** This is a pun, btw. Rephrase.....perhaps try to be a little more subtle/obscure.

ii.

The Religious Category as the Possibility of Metacritical Reflection

Ontoepistemologically interpreted, the Kierkegaardian spheres of the Ethical, the Aesthetic, and the Religious can be seen as the humble forshadowings of a number of postmodern ontologies that speak of an asymmetrical subject enunciated by a return to language after it has shown itself to be an unreliable means of representation. These novel concepts, and not the Lutheran ideas of individuality and *sola fe*, are the primary concerns of Kierkegaard's writing and philosophy, and what make his work salvageable from the ruins of Existentialism and the stale repetitiveness of most

Theology. And not merely salvageable, but worthy of being elevated to the status of being a systematic onto-epistemology, despite his repeated attempts at dissuading readers from elevating it to that status. Ironically, his readers took him at his word.

And, ironically, perhaps we should as well. When Kierkegaard states that "A logical system is possible" and "A metaphysical system is impossible", what does he mean? Are we to take this at face value or understand it as a paradoxical proof of its own claims? By Kierkegaard's strict categorical division between the transcendental and the existential, to declare the impossibility of forming a metaphysical system is to declare something systematically metaphysical, because if there is no way to *speaktink*; He *creates*. God does not *exist*; He is *eternal*"(my emphasis). God is not, in other words, *existential*. He does not think, because thought is necessarily *reflective* or *projective* (i.e. spatiotemporal); he creates (ex nihilo) . God *is* transcendent. And that is about all that we can *positively say* about God. Language can only deal with the transcendent in a logical system by acknowledging its own limitations when faced with the disruptive phenomena experienced by its subjects, i.e. by negation. ~~It is not a reliable medium for representation of the eternal, creation ex nihilo, or religious (that is to say, subjective) experiences, but can be utilized in reflection on such experiences; however, once this is done, what is spoken about belongs to either the realm of Ethics or the realm of Aesthetics, escaping the Religious realm or falling into circulation between the two.~~
—It is important to note that the Ethical and the Aesthetic are two means of representation that are teleologically opposed to one another. Where the Aesthetic is self-serving, Ethics aims to...

of the metaphysical, then there is simply no way. Language only functions within the boundaries of spatiotemporality and therefore cannot make judgments on that which is infinitely defined via negation. Hence, Kierkegaard's declaration: "God does not
iii.

Notes on the Leap of Faith

The "leap of faith" can perhaps be better understood as the nonquantificational movement from one cognitive stage of development to another. In this sense, the "religious" stage does not represent a grand telos but sits at equal level with the aesthetic and ethical stages, representing, however, a metacritical cognitive stage of development. Each of the stages is marked by (1.) a distinct way of organizing data, (2.) a distinct utilization of data, (3.) a distinct teleology. Qualitatively distinct, these stages omit the possibility of moving, along an unbroken chain of reasoning solely, from one to the other although each stage can be considered "from the point of view" of Kierkegaard's authors.

An Elaboration

1. Data organization:

a. The Aesthetic: experimental, individually teleological, disjunctive, a plurality of languages (here, genres).

b. The Ethical: nonexperimental, collectively teleological, a universal language

c. The Religious: metacritical, absolutely teleological, metalingual

2. Data utilization:

a. The Aesthetic:

b. The Ethical:

c. The Religious:

3. Teleology:

a.

b.

c.